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Myers and Trapenberg Frick: Rebuilding Common Purpose

REBUILDING COMMON PURPOSE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
WITH NEW CIVIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Dowell Myers* and Karen Trapenberg Frick†
ABSTRACT
Increasing polarization and division are the greatest challenges to the U.S.
today, because they prevent cooperation in decision making about growing
problems of major consequence. The related long swing in rising individualism is
assessed for how it undermines common purpose. We survey the ideological divide
and how it intersects with preferred urban development patterns, negotiation styles
(compromise or hard line), and diverse views on mitigations for stemming the
COVID-19 pandemic. An especially potent factor was rapidly changing racial
projections, the reckless framing of which led to exaggerated perceptions of
“demographic threat” and a widened partisan divide. Renewed civic infrastructure
is needed for public communication that spans diverse groups to build shared
understanding and new sense of common purpose. A broad suite of strategies is
identified at different interpersonal scales of interaction and engagement for
narrowing the divide. The overarching strategy redirects attention to commonalities
and hopeful outlooks, instead of spotlighting festering division for sensational news
or to promote separate interests via wedge issues. Solutions involve narrative
construction and rhetorical devices for highlighting interest connections and shared
benefits, as well as structured small group meetings for humanizing opponents,
taking small steps toward finding common ground, and building small bridges
toward mutual understanding. These endeavors seek to build social capital for
further strengthening shared middle ground in other deliberations that may follow.
INTRODUCTION
Successful planning depends on broad public belief in the shared benefits
to cooperation. That background condition persisted for much of the 20 th century
but began to unravel in the 1980s, further shredding in the early decades of the new
century. Forces of polarization have eroded middle ground and left the nation
teetering between opposing visions of our nation and its future course. This is a
great threat to the long-range planning needed to solve our major problems.
Solutions to epic impacts of oncoming climate change, unprecedented housing
shortages and soaring prices, and mounting inequality and racial injustices cannot
*
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proceed without greater consensus amid the polarization. In essence, we need to
restore the civic infrastructure for cooperation, but how might that be done, and
how would that work?
Make no mistake, the forces of division and stalemate are deeply
entrenched. Political journalist Ezra Klein recently offered a broad-based diagnosis
of our predicament in his book, Why We’re Polarized, integrating individual
motivations and systemic forces that carry great momentum. He describes this as a
feedback system which we can see has ever-tightening knots. As Klein outlines,
here is “…the feedback loop of polarization: institutions polarize to appeal to a
more polarized public, which further polarizes the public, which forces the
institutions to polarize further, and so on.” 1
Our most recent, urgent case of polarization on solutions to a shared
problem is found in the divides over mask and vaccine use, a lack of consensus that
plagues efforts to quell the COVID-19 pandemic. This is well highlighted in a Pew
Research Center survey that is startling in its revelations. In a second, large-scale
Pew survey of polarized opinion more broadly, we find that over one-third of the
public holds mixed views that are characterized as neither liberal nor conservative.
Additional insights from this survey address sharp, asymmetric differences in
preference for compromise in policy making, and also reveal even sharper
differences in preferred development patterns of physical communities. However,
once again, the large group in between the ideological extremes is much less rigid
in their development preferences. In the competition for speaking to this neglected
middle, planners have the opportunity to sharpen their own attention and better
focus their messaging.2
Most observers are trapped in the present moment, from which there may
seem to be no escape, but a longer historical view can shed light on the changing
balance between core American values of individualism and community. Lessons
conjured by longtime Washington observer, E. J. Dionne, Jr., in Our Divided
Political Heart, can open the door to more proactive efforts to restore balance. 3
Most recently, political scientists Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett have
offered us a grand synthesis of 125 years of trends, covering economics, politics,

1

Pages 136-137 in Klein, Ezra (2020) Why We are Polarized. New York: Avid Reader Press

2

Trapenberg Frick, Karen, and Dowell Myers (2018) “Speaking with the Middle 40% to Bridge
the Political Divide for Mutual Gains in Planning Agreements,” Planning Theory & Practice,
19:4, 609-615, DOI:10.1080/14649357.2018.1507884
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Dionne, E.J. (2012) Our Divided Political Heart: The Battle for the American Idea in an Age of
Discontent. New York: Bloomsbury.
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society and culture, in their epic book, The Upswing.4 They show how sentiment
for shared community outcomes in all four of these spheres rose from a low-point
during the Gilded Age, reached its heights in the late 1960s, but then fell back
steeply to what are now the current circumstances. Putnam and Garrett argue that
“an apocalyptic worldview” dominates Americans’ views for the future with much
agreement that “this is the worst of times.”5
Projections of the future are central to demography and urban planning.
Within this context, such projections are enlisted by those holding or seeking power
because they confront contemporary audiences with very large amounts of change
aggregated from future years. Whether intended, or sometimes not, this can
manipulate opinion by promising great opportunity or great threat. In fact, Klein
finds that a major link in polarizing the public has been the trend in ongoing racial
change that he terms “the demographic threat.” He accepts this general trend as a
given, while a clear case can be made that the Census Bureau projections in
question exaggerated and overdramatized the actual changes. Moreover, we find
the narratives used to convey the findings were heedless of the audience and
potential impacts. Other narratives that used the same future data could highlight
racial change very differently, shifting attention from images of doom (for some
subgroups) to inclusive outlooks on the future that are more broadly hopeful.
Planners often carry responsibility for projections related to transportation,
housing and land use, but after (or before) encountering resistance from local
residents who try to block future change, planners are unable to offer persuasive
narratives. Planners can be faulted, in general, for a certain institutional
complacency. They seem to presume that the importance of planning goals is selfevident because of their greater benefits. Of course, it might seem obvious, but it is
unwise to skip over the necessary persuasion in competition with individualism,
which is even more powerfully self-evident. The reason why planners may be
complacent is because the profession is rooted in the long span of the 20 th century
when there was such agreement particularly by those in leadership positions and at
a time when even Republican presidents sponsored major infrastructure plans. 6
Today, before any planning initiatives can be successful, there seems to be a need
to shore up a necessary precursor, namely, to restore belief in cooperation among
members of the public. The development of such basic civic infrastructure should

4

Putnam, Robert D., and Shaylyn Romney Garrett (2020) The Upswing: How America Came
Together a Century Ago and How We can Do it Again. New York: Simon And Schuster.
5

Putnam and Garrett, p. 8.

6

None could be bigger than the interstate freeway program launched under the Eisenhower
Administration.
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not be an obligation for planners or local governments, nor was it for much of the
20th century, but now is different in our era of polarization.
This essay will close with the outline of a toolkit to help with the task of
rebuilding civic infrastructure necessary to support community agreements, a
platform with several disparate planks, each of which can contribute in particular
ways to rebuilding a sense of common purpose. At the broadest scale we need to
change the public rhetoric that currently centers on highlighting divisions and
conflicts, replacing that with stronger public attention to the many positive
interconnections and mutual gains to come. At the scale of specific meetings, ample
experience has highlighted the many practical benefits of sharing conversations
between fellow humans who happen to come from different camps, finding
common ground and building small bridges across differences. 7 It is also important
to speak to the neglected middle third or 40% of opinion holders via Pew results or
similar 40% of independent voters via a 2021 Gallup survey, 8 rather than solely to
the strong activists on opposing extremes. We summarize these practical steps in
the conclusion.
So, let’s get on with the effort to begin a stronger articulation for public
understanding.
THE CHANGING BALANCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY
From its founding, the United States has treasured a balance between two
core values, one of individual freedom and opportunity, the other a communitylevel concern for shared endeavors that foster the common good. Surely this
originated through a white, Eurocentric debate among “founding fathers,” giving
scant consideration for the Native Americans’ removal or African Americans being
enslaved. However, as Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. justly argued: “when
the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which
every American was to fall heir,” no matter their race or gender. 9 Likewise, the twin
values of individual and community would be absorbed by all who participated in
American culture, values that sometimes appear to be in competition but are
7

powell, john a. (2021, February 15) “Bridging or Breaking? The Stories We Tell Will Create the
Future We Inhabit,” Nonprofit Quarterly. https://nonprofitquarterly.org/bridging-or-breaking-thestories-we-tell-will-create-the-future-we-inhabit/
8

Jones, Jeffrey M. (2022, January 17) “U.S. Political Party Preferences Shifted Greatly During
2021” https://news.gallup.com/poll/388781/political-party-preferences-shifted-greatly-during2021.aspx
9

Passage from Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have a Dream,” speech delivered August
28, 1963, as part of the March on Washington to demonstrate support for civil rights legislation
proposed by President John F. Kennedy.
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mutually supportive. When Alexis de Tocqueville made his historic survey of
American civic life in the 1830’s, he reported the extreme independence of the
rugged pioneers, which he labeled as “individualism” for the first time. But he also
noted the high degree of community support that individuals contributed to one
another, so much so that he judged this to be “self-interest rightly understood,” even
making that the title of a chapter in Democracy in America (Tocqueville 1840).
In his broad historical survey, E.J. Dionne, professed centrist and
Washington Post political interpreter, found that a balance has existed between
promotion of individual rights and community investment, from the founding of
the nation to the present. Although that balance has always varied, subject to the
politics of each era, some decades swing more one way or the other: “American
history is defined by an irrepressible and ongoing tension between two core values:
our love of individualism and our reverence for community.” 10
Individualism on the Rise
Much of this was called into political question in the early 2010’s when the
Tea Party movement theatrically invoked the image of the Founders as promoting
individual freedom to the exclusion of any community interests. 11 The Tea Party’s
political vision of America’s founding, in Dionne’s judgment, appeared to begin
with the 1880s, the so-called Gilded Age, when unfettered individualism (and
robber baronism) was at its very height. In fact, that golden standard was an
aberration in the history of the United States. Dionne finds a more prosperous
period of burgeoning strength and growing equality, leaning toward community
more than individualism, beginning after 1900, in the Populist and Progressive eras,
and continuing through about 1980. He terms this period the Long Consensus, a
time when America was most successful in providing both community supports and
private opportunities for its individual residents.
We now have a new quantitative and narrative accounting of the changing
balance of individual and community interests over more than a century, from 1890
to 2017, newly produced by Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett, The
Upswing.12 By combining multiple time series of indicator data covering the last
century, they portray the relative upswing in community sentiment from 1900 to
the late 1960s, followed by a steady descent to the present day. The remarkable
10

Dionne (p. 4)

11

Trapenberg Frick, Karen (2013) The actions of discontent: Tea Party and property rights
activists pushing back against regional planning. Journal of the American Planning
Association, 79(3), 190-200.
12

Robert Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett (2020) The Upswing: How America Came
Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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feature is that overall trends in four dimensions of social change (economic
inequality, political polarization, social fragmentation, and cultural narcissism)
follow the same timing and relative rate of change.
Thus, measured in multiple ways, these four streams of events…
“… Shaped an America that was more equal, less contentious, more
connected, and more conscious of shared values than the America of the Gilded
Age. But then, unexpectedly … the diverse streams simultaneously reversed
direction, and since the 1960s America has become steadily less equal, more
polarized, more fragmented, and more individualistic—a second Gilded Age.” 13
Putnam and Garrett express hope that the pendulum will turn and begin a
rebalancing, because they find conditions were better before the great decline of all
measures: “Americans since the Sixties have had both slow growth and less
equality and community—the worst of both worlds.”14 But there is no sign in their
latest data (2017) that the rise of individualism is beginning to slow or level off.
And they suggest no mechanisms or triggers that would shift this trend. Sadly, they
can only assert that America had an upswing once before and it can happen again.
We might surmise that the COVID-19 pandemic that began in spring 2020
(after their book was in press) has a magnitude and geographic reach that might
potentially prove a significant factor. Could this provide a prod to begin shifting
the trend? We examine survey evidence below, which are not reported as trend data
but still can shed light on potential forces (e.g., how do attitudes toward
individualist behavior differ under conditions of higher or lower COVID deaths).
Individualism Weakens Urban Planning
Tensions between individuals and community are familiar in urban
planning, which faces perennial struggle to balance interests of individual property
owners and the community as a whole. Development restrictions seek an orderly,
efficient and fair pattern of development, preserving enough open space, or
ensuring adequate parking, and making choices to permit enough commercial
activity to serve residents’ needs and also bolster the local economy and tax base.
Individuals who have ideas for increasing the intensity of use on their particular
parcel may chafe at restraints on free use of their land, and yet they also seek
protection from their neighbors’ intrusive use of their own property. In traffic
planning we find a metaphor for ideal governance in the operation of the traffic
light, which restricts individual drivers’ movements so as to preserve a greater good
of orderly free movement, as well as individual protection from dangers of
13

Putnam and Garrett, p. 285-86.

14

Putnam and Garrett, p. 340.
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collision. Other virtues to traffic-light restrictions also are claimed, namely their
short-term dictates and the object fairness that vehicles of rich and poor in theory
are treated with equality by the mechanical traffic light.
Yet even the traffic light can be challenged by strong proponents of
individualism and free choice, as anthropologist William H. Westermeyer learned:
“These ideals are a foundational aspect of American cultural identity in general but
are especially so for right-wing populists…. [One interviewee against Covid-19
related mandates] used an odd metaphor: not yielding to a red light. She argued
that one makes a choice as to whether to stop or go through an intersection when
the light turns red. The person risks injury or a legal penalty but it is their
choice.”[first emphasis added]15
Land use restrictions may be much more politically fraught than traffic (but
traffic impacts of land use change can be a center of disputes). Land use restrictions
represent not only friendly protection from neighbors’ abuses, but also government
control of “turf” that neighborhood groups may attempt to seize so they can
preserve the local status quo and exclude newcomers. New development also holds
prospects of profits by developers, which established residents resent as coming at
the neighbors’ expense and view as unjustified. 16 Existing homeowners have a
strong self-interest in the status quo, especially when suppression of new
construction has the side benefit of increased house values due to shortages. Given
that two-thirds or more of voters17 are these advantaged homeowners, when does
broader community interest to provide housing opportunity for all get factored in?
Planning Profession Needs to Shore Up Arguments for Community
The closing of the Long Consensus in the balance between community and
individualism poses a special challenge for urban planning, a profession that
emerged in the Progressive era and rode the long wave of support for community
investment. Planners may have taken this political context that supported the
planning profession for granted. However, beginning with the rise of Reaganism,
and also with the rise of citizen activism for environment, neighborhoods, and
particular political movements, the social and administrative underpinnings of
15

Page 122 in William H. Westermeyer (2021) "Freedom over Fear: Fundamentalist Populism and
the Challenge of COVID-19." Open Anthropological Research 1: 116-128.
16

See Paavo Monkkonen and Michael Manville (2019) “Opposition to development or opposition
to developers? Experimental evidence on attitudes toward new housing,” Journal of Urban
Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/07352166.2019.1623684
17

The Census Bureau does not report voting turnout by housing tenure status. However, 65% of
households are homeowners, and homeowners are believed to register and turnout to vote more
reliably than renters, so more than 65% of the voters are surely homeowners.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

77

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 11

planning are much weakened. This is no longer the age of Robert Moses
(thankfully) where power and authority is handed down from above. Instead, it’s
the age of democratization of planning where citizens can organize on social media,
create sensational videos, and distribute their interpretations over the internet in real
time faster than a public agency can write up the minutes.18 Depending on one’s
point of view and where one sits on issues at stake, this can provide a range of
opportunities or challenges. Planners, in particular, have shown weakness in
response, because the Long Consensus led them to presume legal and moral
authority in tandem with firm political support and dismissal of those with differing
views. Planners never before needed a persuasive argument to justify a shared
community emphasis.
IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDES IN THE CURRENT MOMENT
Planners and urban observers have practical awareness of deep ideological
schisms that plague decision making in the way cities are planned. Recent
polarization has widened the divides, and yet at the same time the potential of a
large middle ground may be overlooked because of the attention claimed by ardent
activists on the right and the left to their particular side of the political spectrum
and their designated enemy on the other side. In 2014, the Pew Research Center
conducted an in-depth survey of many issues in polarization, drawing on an
exceptionally large sample (N=10,013) to delve into detailed groups and categories
of belief.19 Ideology was assessed by combining a 10-question sequence that probed
a range of beliefs. What may be surprising is how many respondents (39%)
expressed mixed opinions across the different queries, leaning toward neither
liberal nor conservative views. Also surprising is that only 9% expressed strictly
conservative views, with another 18% expressing mostly conservative views (a
total of 27% conservative or leaning conservative). On the liberal end of the
spectrum, 12% were classified as strictly liberal, while another 22% were leaning
toward liberal (a total of 34% liberal or leaning liberal).

18

Trapenberg Frick, Karen. (2016). Citizen activism, conservative views & mega planning in a
digital era. Planning Theory & Practice, 17(1), 93-118; Trapenberg Frick, Karen. (2013). The
actions of discontent: Tea Party and property rights activists pushing back against regional
planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, 79(3), 190-200.
19

Pew Research Center (2014, June) Political Polarization in the American Public: How
Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and
Everyday Life.
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So, the upshot is that the political makeup of America is ideologically more
centrist than one might think, judging from the vitriol exchanged from the opposite
poles. The important question is how ideology intersects with specific outcomes of
practical importance. Examples to follow include divisions about preferred urban
development, negotiating strategies (compromise or hardline), and some key
COVID related divisions of mask wearing and vaccines.
Preferred Pattern of Urban Development
What kind of physical community do people want to live in? Pew Research
Center asked this spectrum of citizens a question fundamental to urban lifestyles
and the urban planning agenda:
Imagine for a moment that you are moving to another community.
Would you prefer to live in:
A community where the houses are larger and farther apart, but
schools, stores, and restaurants are several miles away [OR,
randomizing the order of choices]
A community where the houses are smaller and closer to each other, but
schools, stores, and restaurants are within walking distance. (Q.A8, Jan
23-Feb 9, 2014)
We can refer to the first option as the “dispersed community” option,
resembling conventional suburbanization and also generating more of the
greenhouse gas emissions that threaten climate change (although the respondents
were not told these consequences). The second option might be termed the
“compact community” option, featuring greater density, proximity, and walkability
(and potentially better served by transit). Overall, the respondents split 49-48
between these questions (remainder uncertain). But the split among liberals and
conservatives as shown in Figure 1 was highly skewed, in fact, more so than almost
any subject area Pew has surveyed.
Liberals were highly receptive to the kind of city that the planning
profession seeks to promote for reasons of reduced land consumption, more
efficient transit service and better environmental impacts, while conservatives were
desirous of the decentralized land use patterns common to suburban development
in the last few decades. It bears brief mention that older respondents in the Pew
data, both liberal and conservative, were relatively more open to the compact city
option, while adults 30-49 were least attracted. Within each ideology group there
are lifecycle differences that suggest groups may not be as monolithic as appears,
and so different features may be attractive for reaching agreements. Overall, it is
noteworthy that sizable shares of conservatives preferred the compact alternative
(and, likewise, liberals, the dispersed).
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Figure 1
Preferences for Development Pattern, by Political Ideology
Source: Pew Research Center (2014, June) Political Polarization in the American Public

To Compromise or Negotiate a Hard Line?
A major point of caution revealed in the Pew survey of polarization is an
asymmetry between liberals and conservatives in their support of negotiated
decision making that might involve compromises. A question asked:
Thinking about elected officials in Washington who share your positions on
the most important issues facing the nation:
Should they work with elected officials they disagree with, even if it
results in some policies you don’t like [OR]
Should they stand up for their positions, even if that means little gets
done in Washington. (Q.B12, Feb 12-Feb 26, 2014)
Overall, 71% of liberals (either consistent or leaning) supported their
elected officials working with those they disagreed with, compared to only 42% of
conservatives. In fact, the most consistent conservatives espoused an especially
hard line. Nearly two-thirds (63%) wanted their elected officials to stick to their
principles and not compromise. In contrast, the most consistent liberals were far
less strict: only 14% wanted their elected officials to stick to their principles rather
than compromise, while 82% thought they should work with those they disagreed
with to arrive at policies. In practice, such an unbalanced negotiation stance would
pit pliable agreement seekers against hardline holdouts, thus either failing to reach
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agreement or settling on one much more in line with preferences of conservatives
than liberals.20
A different pragmatic conclusion might be drawn, however. If
conservatives are less likely to support bending on terms, perhaps efforts might
focus on reshaping the principles being upheld so rigidly. Or the very definition of
what it means to “win” could be reworked by following Fisher, Ury and Patton’s
(1991) negotiation strategy of inventing new options for mutual gain.21
Compromise half-way is not their objective; rather, the aim is to stimulate creative
collaboration in addressing a shared problem, designing a solution package that
fully meets the needs of both parties. More leaders should recognize the
depolarizing contributions of this negotiating approach.
Could the COVID Pandemic Establish a Common Purpose?
Meanwhile, a major, new shared problem, the COVID-19 Pandemic has
swept across the U.S. and the globe for two years. As we asked above, could this
new emergency trigger a shift in public sentiment toward greater priority on
community solidarity? Is this going to finally initiate the new upswing that Putnam
and Garrett say we are due for? Certainly, we all share the same air, and the science
is clear that the coronavirus is airborne and passed among infected people in close
quarters, some of whom may actually be asymptomatic. The three principal tools
recommended by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) for fighting the
contagion are social distancing, wearing masks, and taking a vaccine and
subsequent boosters (although that was not an option in the first year of the
pandemic). Amid all the conflicting information and disputes about the pandemic
lie deep questions about whether the goal is protecting oneself or protecting others
from contracting the virus. Said differently, if a person is unconcerned about the
coronavirus threat to themselves, should they still be mindful of their potential
impacts on the health of others in the community?
Rising above the medical technicalities and political theatrics, a
commonsense analogy could be helpful, and the apt metaphor is of a brushfire. We
urge property owners to conduct brush clearance so that risk of wildfire damage is
reduced. The immediate risk is to the property owner, but every untended property
is a stepping-stone that could allow a brushfire to travel through the whole
community. In Smoky the Bear, public-safety parlance, “only you can prevent
forest fires.” Nonetheless, some property owners remain defiant about absolute
20

Dionne (p. 11) notes something similar, calling this a “moment of asymmetric polarization”
because Democrats are always more ready to compromise.
21
Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton (1991) Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In. New York: Penguin.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

81

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 11

control of their property, ignoring the inherent interdependence of proximity and
presuming their actions are unconnected to the well-being of others.
Survey evidence asking about community cohesion in fighting the COVID19 pandemic is disappointing. Pew Research Center reports, “When it comes to the
importance of tight restrictions on public activity, 53% of all adults say there is a
mix of views in their community on this issue,” making it contentious. 22 In fact,
47% report the coronavirus outbreak has “driven people apart in their local
community,” while 13% report it has “brought people together.” (The remainder
perceived it did not make much difference.) Very similar shares were reported
across types of communities — urban (45%), suburban (48%) and rural (46%) —
saying the pandemic has driven people apart in their local community. Republicans
(50%) were slightly more likely than Democrats (45%) to say this. 23
Perceptions of the risk from COVID might differ greatly with reported
impacts in the respondents’ respective counties. Pew asked their survey
respondents whether getting a vaccine is important and separately whether wearing
a mask or face covering in stores/other businesses is important. They then compared
the responses to death records from coronavirus recorded in the last 8 weeks in the
respondents’ home counties, thus measuring the recent local risk of death.
Of those in counties with a lower risk (fewer than 10 deaths per 100,000
population), 34% said wearing a mask was important and 43% said getting a
COVID-19 vaccine was important.24 However, in counties with a higher risk of
death (more than 25 deaths per 100,000 population), a lower share (14%) said
wearing a mask was important and only 17% said getting a vaccine was important,
expressing priorities directly opposite to the higher level of risk. 25,26
Finally, a different survey organization asked whether people planned to
make changes in their normal activities for reasons of safety and public health in
view of the rising Omicron variant. Among Democrats, 65% said they would make
changes, while 30% planned to “continue my normal activity.” These shares of
22

Pew Research Center (2021, December) “Americans Are Less Likely Than Before COVID-19
To Want To Live in Cities, More Likely To Prefer Suburbs,” p. 14.
23

Pew (2021), p. 13.

24

Pew (2021), p. 17.

25

People living in counties with two-and-a-half times the risk of death from coronavirus took
precautions less than half as often.
26

In fairness, we should recognize that the coronavirus hit New York first (spring of 2020), well
before descending on the red states in the interior and the south. That geographic difference in
timing might have enabled a cultural divide to take root in the first months of the pandemic, after
which, when deaths rose later in red states, local people stuck to their early COVID practices.
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cooperation were reversed among Republicans: 30% planned to make changes and
65% would continue normal activity.27 This underscores the Pew survey findings
that the issue of COVID and public deliberations and government responses that
surround it are driving people apart. Thus far there is little clear evidence that the
COVID-19 Pandemic could mark a turning point toward greater community
priority.
In considering these survey results, the divisive factor of responses to
COVID is not so much the attitude toward one’s individual health risk but the fact
that, if other people take actions to suppress the spread of disease, that improves
the health prospects for the whole community, including non-participants. Some
might call them “free riders” because they are nonpayers in the community fight
against virus spread. Respectful to the views of others who oppose mandates, we
acknowledge many have a different moral calculus, including worries about
vaccine safety or that each mandate is a step towards government tyranny and away
from precious freedom of choice they vigorously defend. The public health science
and prescribed mitigation strategies that depend on public cooperation are now
drawn into the broader culture wars that battle over symbolism of language and
approved behavior.28
POWERFUL USE OF THE FUTURE IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING
Projections of the future are a central element when planning activities that
have a multi-year lead time for execution or whose programs and facilities will have
decades-long impacts. They are central to planners exercising leadership about the
path ahead as Arthur C. Nelson has demonstrated. 29 Results of forecast models have
such a powerful role in project approval that transportation planning expert Martin
Wachs was famed for his ethical criticism of how assumptions could be
manipulated before the results were shared with the public. 30 More generally, the
capacity of projections to magnify numbers in the future, and then telescope those
back to the present, makes even the future itself a very impactful tool for impressing
audiences. Sometimes the impacts are planned, but oftentimes they amount to
unintended collateral damage, even heavy backlash.
27
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Challenge of COVID-19." Open Anthropological Research 1: 116-128.
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Present-Individualism versus Community-Future
In the contest between present and future in community deliberations, the
future is always uncertain and also often not agreed on, even if hopeful. The present,
however, is known and the status quo is protected by individuals through loss
aversion. Essentially, given that many community investments are proposals for the
future that will benefit others, planners face an unequal contest between an
uncertain and unagreed community future on one hand, and on the other hand, a
firmly ensconced present-individual perspective. Primacy granted individualism
relative to community often reflects this unstated bias in favor of the present relative
to the future.31
The association with future versus present is inescapable for proposals to
benefit the community or world more largely, so planners or policy makers must
accept a more explicit persuasive role with regard to future benefits. Certainly,
those benefits could face opposition, as in the case of climate change, but other
future changes are more proximate and undeniable. An underused factor where we
have data readily at hand, whose changes are inexorable and undeniable, and which
is well-known in every family is age. Age and future go together hand in hand, and
reliance on this common denominator of society surely helps to reduce future
uncertainties. We know that the baby boomers are growing older, and the
millennials as well, and we know that children in preschool today will advance to
high school in a dozen years or so and become prime age workers and taxpayers a
decade after that. With all these cohorts guaranteed to grow older, including
boomers who are certain to draw expensive retirement benefits, and with better
educated young people likely to earn higher incomes and pay higher taxes, current
spending on the young is not charity, or a consumption subsidy, but the wisest
investment possible for the benefit of society and older people in particular. Reports
from the National Academy of Sciences make clear these future societal benefits of
reducing child poverty today32 and promoting higher education among an
increasingly diverse youth population.33 It’s the equitable thing to do and, important
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for gaining political support, it also promises mutual benefits for the whole of
society.34
Demographic Threat and Loss of Common Purpose about the Future
Since the early 2000s or earlier, an underlying driving force causing
polarization among the public has been the reported trend in racial change. In his
work, Why We’re Polarized, political journalist Ezra Klein devotes a pivotal
chapter to “Demographic Threat,” calling this “… the core cleavage of our politics,
and it reflects a defining trend of our era: America is changing, and fast.” The
principal expert he relies on is Jennifer Richeson, a Yale professor of psychology,
who conducted pioneering experiments in 2014, with colleague Maureen Craig,
testing reactions of white study participants to the facts of a projected decline of
whites to become a minority of the U.S. population. In a word, they responded
badly, reacting defensively and less generously, not only with regard to social
policies related to race and immigration, but also with reduced support of defense
spending and public service funding more broadly. 35 In fact, their broader
conclusion is that growing diversity, instead of making America more tolerant,
actually can increase intergroup hostility.36 The notion of perceived threat from
racial change is long-established in sociology and political science, but Craig and
Richeson’s experiments provided laboratory proof of consequences from that
threat. And they rightly surmised that the racial trend might lead to greater partisan
divides.
Political backlash had already begun a decade earlier when a landmark book
within the Washington beltway proclaimed the dawn of a lasting new progressive
era based on expected racial demographic change and nonwhite voting patterns that
leaned heavily Democratic. John Judis and Ruy Teixeira made sure in 2002 that
every politician understood the consequences, by including “Democratic majority”
in their title.37 Their simple calculations underestimated the complexities of
projections and presumed a strong persistence of racial voting patterns, including
34

Myers, Dowell (2015) “Mutual Benefits and Equity amid Racial Diversity: A Generational
Strategy for Growing a Broader Base of Support for Social Equity.” Journal of Planning
Education and Research 35(3):369-375.
35

Maureen A. Craig and Jennifer A. Richeson (2014a) “On the Precipice of a “Majority-Minority”
America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’
Political Ideology,” Psychological Science 25: 1189-97.
36

Maureen A. Craig and Jennifer A. Richeson (2014b) “More Diverse Yet Less Tolerant? How
the Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape Affects White Americans' Racial Attitudes,”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (6): 750-61.
37
John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira (2002) The Emerging Democratic Majority, New York: Simon
& Schuster.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

85

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 11

that new immigrants would vote similarly. Yet the message undermined itself via
backlash it generated.
Subsequent population projections by the Census Bureau proved to be
rapidly changing from previous editions and unintentionally led to heightened
perceptions of threat. The reality of racial change was inexorable, but its
measurement and public communication was subject to substantial distortion. The
date that the Census Bureau projected for the white population’s fall to minority
status was rapidly changing, speeding up the anticipated transition from 2059
(outlook in 2000) to 2050 (in 2004), and plunging even further to 2042 (in summer
2008).38 To convey the sense of acceleration, when the projections were revised
after 4 years, the coming date of the so-called “tipping point,” was 12 years closer
than it was 4 years earlier, and this acceleration was repeated twice before fall of
2008. This escalating decline of whites might be alarming to some and it was
capped by a Black Democrat moving into the White House, seeming to prove out
the prophecies of Judis and Teixeira. And New York Times columnist Charles Blow
wonders where the fatalist, “white extinction anxiety,” comes from? 39 Republicans,
in particular, might feel a tremendous sense of doom from this turn of events.
The definition of “white” is crucial to the trend, and over the years the
Census Bureau revised some assumptions and narrowed the definition of the
“white” category, shrinking its numbers by subtracting out all white Hispanic
people, and later taking out any multiracial whites.40 Naturally that substantially
increased the rate of decline in the reported “white” trend. The Bureau also could
be faulted more generally for focusing on the binary of “non-Hispanic white alone”
versus everyone else when that is very diverse itself.41 Once put into a projection
38
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framework, these flaws are greatly amplified and surely had an impact on the
audience for the reported projections. (Yes, there is an audience, and they vote
defensively in response to fears.)
Fearful reactions undermine common purpose and are to be avoided if
possible. More than one narrative can explain the same data about racial change in
America. The effects that different narratives about changing racial demographics
can have were tested in a survey experiment designed by Morris Levy, political
science professor at USC, and Dowell Myers.42 This was fielded in summer 2016,
before the Trump election, and results were shared with top Census Bureau officials
in a workshop meeting that December. Did our white audience of survey
participants object to growing diversity itself or more to the idea that whites were
destined to soon become a minority of the population? And how did these reactions
differ between Democrats and Republicans? As shown in Figure 2, when white
respondents were randomly assigned to read different simulated news stories based
on these projection data, their expressed attitudes depended greatly on how the
stories were framed, as packaged into three different storylines: the coming white
minority, growing diversity, and a blending account that totaled all people who
identified as white at least in part. (The control group read an unrelated
environmental story.)

census,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/2020-census-whitepopulation-decline/620470/
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Figure 2
Percent Anxious or Angry after Reading Different Census News Stories, by Party Registration
Source: Dowell Myers and Morris Levy (2018) “Racial Population Projections and Reactions to
Alternative News Accounts of Growing Diversity;” whites only; random assignment to read one of
four different stories

Republicans, in particular, reacted with greater anxiety or anger after
reading the standard account highlighting white residents becoming a minority by
2044, the shrinking or “coming minority”. In the “diversity” story, they read about
rapid growth of Asian and Hispanic residents (82% and 74%, respectively), 43 but
not stating that whites would be a minority at a coming date. The “blending” story
featured whites holding a sustained majority to mid-century by including Hispanic
residents who said they were white in the total of whites, while also explaining to
respondents that this was due to “a major rise in the number of Americans with
mixed-race ancestry that includes a white parent or grandparent.” Republicans were
fine with all that, just as long as they were not told whites would shrink to a
43

All other groups are slowly growing or maintaining a constant share, so they are not changing
the composition of the population the way Asian and Hispanic resident growth does.
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minority.44 It should be noted that white Democrats also were made more anxious
by the white minority story, but not to the extent of Republicans. Ample evidence
subsequently has been reported that reaction to the perceived demographic threat
was instrumental in Donald Trump’s election.45
The conclusion to this discussion of demographic threat is that the narrative
told to the public appears to be at least as important as the underlying reality of
racial change. There are acute dangers from projections that telescope decades of
future change into the present, so care must be taken lest audiences react as if all
that change is occurring this year. A further lesson is that projections can be
described in ways that elicit a more divisive reaction if change is described in a
zero-sum fashion, but it is equally accurate, and more constructive, if change is
discussed in a way that includes all groups so that they see themselves as having a
place in the future.
As a final word on demographic threat, Klein wisely concludes: “…
California and Texas [have already] transitioned into majority-minority status
without falling to pieces. Politicians able to articulate a vision of this future that is
inclusive, inspiring, and nonthreatening…will reap massive rewards.” 46
CONCLUSIONS
Strengthening or restoring common purpose is essential to undergird
collective decision making. We have touched on a number of topics on which
opinions have polarized and yet we found bases for narrowing differences. We
assemble those lessons here and draw additional lessons reported from related
insightful studies. Effectively, we are contributing to building a new civic
infrastructure for growing social cohesion and mitigating harsh differences. The
six strategies presented here cover a variety of scales of interaction and
engagement, from specific practices useful in small group gatherings, to broad
narrative strategies useful in the public arena at a mass scale. In truth, there is a
strong interaction between the two scales of activity. All share the common
objective of closing the distance between the outlooks or positions of opposing
groups. It is near impossible to traverse common ground and find solutions
together, whether on low or high stakes issues, if different camps heap public scorn
44
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and dehumanize one another, or when people are fixated solely on wedge issues of
division and are driven by fear of hyped-up threats. All these elements feeding
polarization must be mitigated if we are to restore common purpose.
Strategies for Strengthening Common Purpose
1. Closing the distance between groups by finding common ground. You
can’t find common ground if you are standing in separate places or too far apart.
Small steps are needed to partially close the distance to improve chances for later
agreement. Legal scholar and professor john a. powell recommends starting with
small bridges related to our shared humanity that many can agree on, for example,
goals related to child well-being such as the provision of nutritious meals. 47 In
parallel, planning scholar John Forester provides hope for planners in suggesting
there is ample room in that we can focus on smaller yet important topics. 48 Once
trust and social capital are built on these issues, thornier issues can be tackled along
both substantive and procedural lines for other shared efforts. 49 There is greater
cooperation at the local level and less partisanship because local businesses and
residents share real problems, and there is less political reliance on symbolic
identity performance.50
2. Countering the dehumanization of opponents. In building small bridges,
rehumanizing the dehumanizing aspects of one’s perceived Enemy Other is mission
critical. Planners can look to organizations such as Welcoming America, Braver
Angels and Living Room Conversations. They actively work with residents from
across the political spectrum to create “low stakes” opportunities for dialogues
between people who otherwise would not be in the same spaces as our world is
becoming even more polarized and siloed geographically, socially and digitally.
47
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For these interactions, the organizations provide discussion guides and tangible tips
for uncovering the other side’s humanity and ways to agree to agree, and
importantly, ways to agree to disagree. 51
3. Reducing public scorn of competing groups’ viewpoints and values.
Through the building of small bridges and “low stakes” conversations in informal
spaces, we may begin to become more comfortable with less public facing scorn
and dehumanization of others. As difficult as it may sound, this is vital for closing
the distance and countering dehumanization. Ironically one of the largest shared
areas of commonality across various sides is that they feel the other side demonizes
them while also being dismissive and dogmatic in their approach. 52 This could even
be a topic for conversation in smaller to larger gatherings to build social capital and
common ground.
4. De-escalating the perception of threat. In both small groups and in the
public arena, strategies are needed to reduce perceived “threat.” Humanizing the
Other and reducing public scorn certainly can help. Misinformation about the
supposed threat also could be directly countered by trusted messengers within a
side, but often new narratives can assuage fears better by reframing the context for
receiving information.53 Sometimes what was thought to be a threat can be
transformed into a solution to a different problem, such as showing how
immigration helps solve problems of an aging society with too few workers or how
migration of a new group is revitalizing the main street of small towns losing
population.54 For lack of proactive narratives, the public assumes everything else is
holding constant and this one new thing is threatening the old order (which is
already past and gone). Crucial is the proactive de-escalation of threat in real time,
such as occurring with racial demographic change discussed above, including
starting now to develop proactive approaches to de-escalation from expected and,
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importantly, unexpected places. This is key as fear, anger and other emotions
buttressed by threat are major deterrents to listening and understanding.
5. Direct attention to connective issues, not wedge issues that are divisive.
With the shoring up of social capital and reduction of public scorn and threat,
attention could begin to focus on connective issues rather than on wedge issues that
divide us because of their inflammatory power. The debate stirred up on divisive
issues preempts the public agenda as these become litmus tests to demonstrate
loyalty to one’s side. Instead, this time, attention, and emotional investment could
be shifted to launching attention campaigns about topics that highlight connections
and commonalities, and brainstorming together about shared problems, and invent
new options for mutual gain following the wisdom of Fisher, Ury and Patton’s
Getting to Yes55, or also the premises of More in Common and Bridge Alliance.
6. Building sense of common purpose through public rhetoric. Social
strategist Suzette Brooks Masters calls for advancing new narratives of the future,
with less focus on policy details and more on a motivating vision. Among her
summary recommendations: “Advance visions of abundance and interdependence
to combat a scarcity, zero-sum mentality that fuels resentment … Adjust the
narrative to affirm unity and a shared vision … [and] Complicate the narrative about
immigrants and demographic change and embrace the messy middle where most
American public opinion resides.” 56
Citizens and leaders need to rebuild a foundation of commonsense support
for cooperation in local and regional communities. We can use narrative, analogy,
and metaphor to direct attention and remind people of beliefs they already hold
about interdependence and mutual benefits. All in together, we must shift the focus
from zero-sum protection of present, individual interest to expanding the longerrange benefits flowing broadly with equity for all. The new civic infrastructure
summarized above enables practical steps toward greater understanding and
cooperation. These steps might begin to actualize the rebalancing and pendulum
upswing between individualism and community.
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